

Will Flowbased market coupling lead to better usage of transmission capacity, increased welfare and security of supply?

ELECTRICITY MARKET INTEGRATION – A NORTH
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

3 March 2015

Patrick Luickx

Advisor CREG – Technical Operation of the Markets

Will Flowbased market coupling lead to better usage of transmission capacity, increased welfare and security of supply?

It's complicated...

- Flow-Based basic principle:
 - Capacity calculation and allocation in the same optimization
 - ATC: capacity determined ahead

- Euphemia formula:
 - Max welfare (Objective function)
 - $\sum PTDF \cdot nex < RAM$ (Constraints)
 - PTDF: power transfer distribution factor
 - Nex: net export positions
 - RAM: remaining available margin

- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion

- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion

HISTORY AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

- 7 June 2007: CWE Memorandum of Understanding
 - *[...] implementation of a flow-based market coupling between the five countries [...]*
- ...
- March 2015: FBMC approval process in last stages
 - Documents on www.casc.eu


- Between now and launch of FBMC
 - Market testing
 - Internal validation by the CWE FBMC Project
 - Flow competition - adequacy discussion
 - (market consultation +) Regulatory approval
- FBMC 2.0 after FBMC 1.0

- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion


WELFARE & OTHER INDICATORS

Weekly day ahead welfare


Development of welfare (XX - ATC) - daily average



Change in average welfare



Price convergence



- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion

REGULATORY ISSUES – FBMC PARAMETERS


Critical Branches (CB)

- FB allocation = Optimisation under constraints corresponding to thermal line capacities of CB
- Capacity on the CB, given to the FBMC :

$$\text{RAM} = F_{\max} - F_{\text{ref}} - \text{FRM} - \text{FAV}$$

- ✓ RAM = remaining available margin (~ ATC value)
- ✓ F_{\max} = maximum allowable flow
- ✓ F_{ref} = physical flow resulting from base case
 - needs to be adjusted for LT nominations
- ✓ FRM = flow reliability margin
- ✓ FAV = Final adjustment value

Critical Branches (CB)




Critical Branches (CB)

- CB = existing branches in the regional grid
- CB determines constraints in the Market Coupling algorithm
- Constraints impact welfare and prices

Choice of CB influences the prices

Generation Shift Key (GSK)

- Trades between zones A, B and C depend on GSK assumptions
- GSK is factor for transforming node-to-line to zone-to-line PTDF



Generation Shift Key (GSK)

- $PTDF_{\text{zone-to-line}}$ is GSK-dependent
- Electricity prices are $PTDF_{\text{zone-to-line}}$ -dependent


$$\frac{P(C) - P(B)}{PTDF_{B \rightarrow C \text{ on } L34}} = \frac{P(C) - P(A)}{PTDF_{A \rightarrow C \text{ on } L34}} = \textit{Shadow price}$$

- With a given $P(C)$ and $P(B)$, $P(A)$ will depend on $PTDF_{B \rightarrow C \text{ on } L34}$

Electricity prices are GSK-dependent

Margins on the CB


- $RAM = F_{\max} - F_{\text{ref}} - FRM - FAV$
- Margins:
 - Flow Reliability Margin (FRM)
 - Final Adjustment Value (FAV)
 - “Special” critical branches
 - Explicit additional constraints in the algorithm
- Reflect uncertainty



- Intuitive example

* Source: CWE TSOs, Intuitiveness “pedagogical” presentation, 22 November 2011

(Results of simulation of FBMC on December 2st, 2010 at 20:00)



- Non-intuitive example

* Source: CWE TSOs, Intuitiveness “pedagogical” presentation, 22 November 2011

(Results of simulation of FBMC on December 1st, 2010 at 07:00)

- FBMC is welfare optimising
≠ Price minimization
- Frequency and importance of non-intuitive results seems higher for smaller zones when there is a mix of large and small zones.
- CWE FBMC will start with “FB intuitive”
 - Following the results of the Market Consultation

- Monitoring: completion of the template of periodic data for regulators
- Type & frequency of monitoring reports
- Important monitoring work of NRAs
 - TSOs have direct impact on prices / market operation
 - Data collection and analysis

- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion

REGULATORY ISSUES – FLOW COMPETITION

- FBMC improves market outcome when no congestion
- FBMC induces flow competition between large and small countries / zones in case of congestion
 - Competition issue under normal circumstances
 - Security of Supply / adequacy issue under scarcity circumstances

- In scarcity conditions:
 - if Belgium competes with France for imports from the Netherlands and Germany
 - risk that import volume in Belgium goes to zero even when bidding 3000€
- “All or nothing” behaviour above a given threshold observed in the current design

Current design lets countries that do not bid max price get all capacity → **mitigation measures**

- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion

STAKEHOLDER ISSUES

- Recognition of improvements with FBMC
 - welfare
- Market has intermediate understanding of FBMC
- Improvements before go-live or in FBMC 2.0
- Concerns of losing welfare gains from Day ahead FBMC in intraday afterwards
 - Impact on ID market is unclear

- Market in CWE wants
 - much transparency
 - To reap all benefits from FBMC
 - Robustness
 - FB intuitive
 - More studies before go-live to better understand

- History and future outlook
- Welfare & other indicators
- Regulatory Issues – FBMC parameters
- Regulatory Issues – Flow Competition
- Stakeholder issues
- Conclusion

CONCLUSION

Will Flowbased market coupling lead to better usage of transmission capacity, increased welfare and security of supply?

Yes,

If all parameters are designed accordingly